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Abstract
Property rights specify an initial default position from which agents
may subsequently bargain to determine their ultimate allocation. The
economics literature has largely focused on how property rights aﬀect
ex ante investments, under the assumption that bargaining always
results in ex post eﬃcient outcomes. In contrast, we examine how
property rights aﬀect the eﬃciency of bargaining and the final alloca-
tions that result. We establish a wide class of economic settings and
property rights in which eﬃcient bargaining is impossible. For these
environments, we examine the optimal allocation of property rights,
including simple property rights, liability rules, and dual-chooser rules.
1 Introduction
Property rights specify an initial default position from which agents may
subsequently bargain to determine their ultimate allocation. Following the
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seminal article of Grossman and Hart (1986), the economics literature dis-
cussing the optimal allocation of property rights has largely focused on how
they aﬀect ex ante investments, under the assumption that bargaining always
results in ex post eﬃcient outcomes. In this paper, we instead examine how
property rights aﬀect the eﬃciency of bargaining and the final allocations
that result.1
According to the “Coase Theorem” (Coase 1960), in the absence of “trans-
action costs,” parties will reach Pareto eﬃcient agreements regardless of ini-
tial property rights. We instead examine settings in which this may not
happen due to transaction costs associated with asymmetric information.
That property rights may matter for the eﬃciency of bargaining can be seen
by comparing Myerson and Satterthwaite’s (1983) conclusion that private
information must generate ineﬃciency in bargaining between a buyer and a
seller, with Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer’s (1987) demonstration that
eﬃcient bargaining mechanisms do exist for more evenly distributed (or ran-
domized) property rights. Here we examine more broadly the nature of
optimal property rights in such settings.
In addition to simple property rights of the sort considered by Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) and Cramton et al. (1987), the legal literature has
considered other forms of property rights. Calebresi and Melamud (1972)
first highlighted the distinction between “property rules,” which correspond
to the simple property rights of the economics literature, and “liability rules,”
in which an agent may harm another agent (e.g., by polluting) but must make
a damage payment to the victim. These liability rules may equivalently be
thought of as an option-to-own.2 Calabresi and Melamud (1972) considered
such liability rules to be desirable only when bargaining is impractical (in
which case they can make the final allocation responsive to values), but sub-
sequent work [Ayres and Talley (1994), Kaplow and Shavell (1995-6, 1996),
Ayres (2005)] has suggested the possibility that liability rules may also be
desirable when bargaining is possible but imperfect. Ayres (2005) also con-
sidered in a two-agent setting “dual chooser” rules in which both agents can
exercise options. In general, liability rules and dual-chooser rules may both
be viewed as particular forms of property rights mechanisms, in which the
default outcome depends on messages sent by the various agents.
1Matouschek (2004) studies this question as well; we discuss the relation to our paper
below.
2Demski and Sappington (1991) and Noldeke and Schmidt (1995) consider the use of
option-to-own contracts to induce eﬃcient ex ante investments.
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This paper advances the literature in two ways. First, we establish a
wide class of economic settings and property rights (including both simple
property rights and liability rules) in which eﬃcient bargaining is impossi-
ble.3 Second, for these environments in which ineﬃciency is unavoidable, we
examine the optimal allocation of property rights, including simple property
rights, liability rules, and dual-chooser rules. In addition to its implications
for the allocation of formal property rights, our analysis can also be applied
to the allocation of decision rights within firms.
Our ineﬃciency result unifies a number of results in the earlier litera-
ture (Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990),
Williams (1999), Figueroa and Skreta (2008), Che (2006)). In contrast to
the earlier literature, our approach to establishing ineﬃciency does not re-
quire performing any computations. Instead, it requires only the verification
of two simple conditions: (i) existence of “adverse eﬃcient-opt-out types”
and (ii) non-emptiness of the core (actually, non-emptiness of a larger set
that we call the “marginal core”) and its multi-valuedness with a positive
probability.4
We define an “eﬃcient-opt-out type” as a type whose non-participation
is consistent with eﬃciency (for any types of the other agents). In addition,
for settings that involve externalities, such as liability rules, we define an
“adverse type” as a type who, when he does not participate and behaves
noncooperatively (e.g., chooses optimally whether to damage others under
a liability rule), minimizes the total expected surplus available to the other
agents. (In settings with simple property rights, in which externalities are
absent, any type is trivially an adverse type.) Our ineﬃciency result applies
when each agent has a type that is simultaneously an eﬃcient-opt-out type
and an adverse type. This assumption is clearly restrictive — for example, it is
not satisfied in the presence of intermediate (or randomized) property rights
of the kind considered by Cramton et al. (1987) and Segal and Whinston
(2011). Nevertheless, we show that this assumption is satisfied in a number
of settings involving simple property rights, liability rules, and dual-chooser
rules. (We also allow this assumption to hold in an asymptotic form: e.g., a
type may become an “almost” adverse eﬃcient-opt-out type as the type goes
to +∞.)
3In Segal and Whinston (2011) we instead establish suﬃcient conditions for first-best
eﬃciency to be achieved.
4Precursors to this approach can be found in Makowski and Ostroy (1989) and Segal
and Whinston (2011).
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In contrast, the non-emptiness and multi-valuedness of the core is a typ-
ical feature of economic settings. For example, if, under an appropriate def-
inition of “goods,” a price equilibrium exists (e.g., a Walrasian equilibrium,
or a Lindahl equilibrium), then it will be in the core, and “generically” the
core will be multi-valued (except for some limiting “competitive” cases with
a large number of agents, where the core may converge to a unique Walrasian
equilibrium).
Having identified a class of settings in which achieving eﬃciency is im-
possible, we then turn to an analysis of the optimal allocation of property
rights in those cases. In doing so, we take a mechanism design approach to
bargaining, asking what property rights would be optimal if bargaining takes
as eﬃcient a form as possible given the allocation of property rights.
We use two diﬀerent measures of eﬃiciency to identify optimal property
rights. In the first, we assume that there is an outside agency who will sub-
sidize the bargaining process in order to achieve eﬃciency and we examine
the eﬀect of property rights on the expected subsidy that is required. One
corollary of our impossibility analysis is a simple formula for this expected
subsidy. The formula allows us to compare the subsidies required by the
various property rights that satisfy (i) and (ii). Among such property rights,
we can identify those that minimize the intermediary’s expected subsidy.
One interesting benchmark for comparison is the property rights that
would maximize the expected surplus were bargaining impossible. With two
agents and simple property rights that induce eﬃcient-opt-out types, we
show that the intermediary’s expected first-best subsidy equals the expected
bargaining surplus, and therefore minimizing this expected subsidy is equiv-
alent to maximizing the expected status quo surplus. For example, in the
buyer-seller model of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), if we can choose
who should initially own the object, it is optimal to give it to the agent with
the higher expected value for it. We also identify the optimal option-to-own
(liability rule) in this same setting, and show that it is exactly the same as
the optimal option-to-own when bargaining is impossible, involving an op-
tion price (damage payment) that equals the expected value (harm) of the
non-choosing agent (victim). As in the case without bargaining, the optimal
option-to-own is strictly better than the best simple property right, but fails
to achieve the first best when there is uncertainty about the value of the
non-choosing agent.
However, the equivalence between what is best for minimizing the ex-
pected first-best bargaining subsidy and what is best absent bargaining gen-
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erally breaks down when there are more than two agents: in such cases,
we instead want to raise the values of coalitions including all but one agent
(reducing the “hold-out power” of individual agents). We illustrate the dif-
ference in two examples, one concerning the optimal ownership of spectrum,
and the other examining the optimal liability rule for pollution when there
are many victims.
Evaluating property rights by their eﬀects on the expected subsidy re-
quired for first-best bargaining may not be the right thing to do, since in
most cases a benevolent intermediary willing to subsidize bargaining is not
available. Our second eﬃciency measure is instead the maximal (“second-
best”) expected surplus that can be achieved in budget-balanced bargaining.
Analysis of the second-best problem is complicated by the fact that the op-
timal allocation rule depends on the identity of the agents least willing to
participate (the “critical types”), which in turn depends on the allocation
rule. Unfortunately, we are unable to solve for the second-best bargaining
procedure at a comparable level of generality to our first-best subsidy calcu-
lation. For this reason, we focus on the case of just two agents.
When divided property rights are not possible, we know from Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) that eﬃciency is impossible when the budget must
be balanced. In such cases, however, use of a liability rule (option-to-own)
may oﬀer an improvement over (and can be no worse than) what can be
achieved with the best undivided property right.
To identify the optimal liability rule, we begin by characterizing the
second-best bargaining mechanism for a given liability rule. Doing so we
identify the critical types for each agent, and the optimal allocation rule.5
We then use this characterization to study the dependence of the maximal
expected surplus on the option price.
We first consider the case in which both agents’ values are distributed
uniformly. We find that the second-best expected surplus is maximized by
setting the option price equal to the expected value of the non-choosing agent
(the “victim”), which is 1/2 under our normalization. Thus, in the uniform
case the optimal option price under second-best bargaining proves to be the
same as the price that minimizes the expected first-best subsidy, which is in
turn the same as the optimal price in the absence of bargaining.
5Independently, Loertscher and Wasser (2014) analyze the second-best bargaining
mechanism for simple intermediate property rights which do not permit first-best eﬃ-
cient bargaining. The two settings share a number of similar technical diﬃculties to be
overcome.
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At the same time, we find a significant diﬀerence in how the second-best
expected surplus and the expected first-best subsidy vary with the option
price. Namely, while in the uniform example the expected first-best subsidy
is always lower the closer the price is to 1/2, the second-best expected surplus
does not increase monotonically with such changes. Instead, we find that
setting the price close to 0 or to 1 yields a lower expected second-best surplus
than setting it at exactly 0 or 1 (which corresponds to giving one of the
agents a simple property right to the object). In fact, we show that the
same conclusion extends to all distributions of the two agents’ valuations
(not just uniform). Thus, contrary to the intuition one might take from the
results of Cramton et. al (1987), less extreme property rights (in the form of
a option price that sometimes leads to exercise of the option) may be worse
than extreme ones.
Finally, we explore cases in which the two agents’ valuations are drawn
from diﬀerent distributions and show that the optimal option price is not
generally equal to the victim’s expected harm. Nonetheless, an intriguing
fact is that in all of the cases we study the optimal option price is very close
to the victim’s expected harm, and the loss from instead setting the option
price equal to that expected harm is small.
In addition to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Cramton, Gibbons,
and Klemperer (1987), a number of other papers examine the eﬀect of prop-
erty rights on bargaining eﬃciency. Most, like our previous paper [Segal and
Whinston (2011)] establish conditions under which the first best is achiev-
able [for additional references, see our (2011) working paper and Segal and
Whinston (2013)]. Others established impossibility of eﬃcient bargaining in
some settings [see Segal and Whinston (2013), Makowski and Ostroy (1989),
and Matsushima (2012)]. Matouschek (2004) was the first paper to consider
second-best optimal property rights under asymmetric information bargain-
ing. He studied a model in which asset ownership  is set irrevocably ex
ante, and bargaining over other decisions  occurs ex post after agents’ types
are determined. In contrast to much of our analysis, bargaining is not al-
lowed to redistribute the initial property rights. He finds that, depending
on the parameters, the optimal property rights  will either maximize the
total surplus at the disagreement point (as if no renegotiation were possible)
or minimize it. Mylovanov and Troger (2012) analyzes a two-agent setting
like ours, but instead uses a specific bargaining protocol in which one agent
has the power to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the other agent. Finally,
in unpublished notes, Che (2006) examines the optimal option-to-own for
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minimizing the expected first-best subsidy.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe our basic
model. Section 3 derives our ineﬃciency result. In Section 4, we analyze
the optimal property rights for minimizing the first-best subsidy. Section 5
analyzes optimal second-best property rights. Section 6 extends our analysis
to consider dual-chooser rules. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Set-Up
We consider a general model with  agents, indexed by  = 1   , who
bargain over a nonmonetary decision  ∈ , as well as a vector  ∈ R of
monetary transfers. Each agent  privately observes a type  ∈ Θ, and his
resulting payoﬀ is  ( ) + . We assume that the types (˜1     ˜) ∈
Θ1 ×   ×Θ are independent random variables.
We will be interested in examining what is achievable given some initial
property rights when the agents engage in the best possible bargaining proce-
dure after their types are realized. To this end, we take a mechanism design
approach to bargaining. Appealing to the Revelation Principle, we focus on
direct revelation mechanisms h i, where  : Θ →  is the decision rule,
and  : Θ → R is the transfer rule. In particular, we will be interested in
implementing an eﬃcient decision rule ∗, which solves:
∗ () ∈ argmax
∈
X

 ( ) for all  ∈ Θ
We let  () ≡P  (∗ ()  ) be the maximum total surplus achievable in
state .
When considering direct revelation mechanisms that correspond to bar-
gaining mechanisms, we restrict them to satisfy budget balance:X

  () = 0 for all  ∈ Θ
and (Bayesian) Incentive Compatibility:
E[((e−) ) +  (e−)]
≥ E[((0e−) ) +  (0e−)] for all   0 ∈ Θ
Next we consider participation constraints. For this purpose, we need to
describe what outcome each agent  expects when he refuses to participate
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in the bargaining mechanism. In general, this outcome will depend on the
property rights mechanism in place and, in general, on the types of the
other agents. For example, the other agents may make some noncooperative
choices under a liability rule, and these choices may depend on their types.
Alternatively, the other agents may be able to bargain with each other over
some parts of the outcome without the participation of agent , and this
bargaining may have externalities on agent . It is also possible that if agent
 refuses to participate, the default will involve a noncooperative game among
agents, and the outcome of this game will depend on all the agents’ types.
To incorporate all these possibilities, we assume that if agent  refuses
to participate and the state of the world is , the nonmonetary decision is
ˆ (), and agent  receives a transfer b (). The resulting reservation utility
of agent  is therefore b () ≡ (ˆ() ) + b()
For example, in the simple special case of simple property rights that induce
a fixed status quo
¡ˆb1 b¢ that either cannot be renegotiated at all
without all agents’ participation or whose renegotiation by a subset of agents
does not aﬀect nonparticipating agents (e.g., because renegotiation can only
involve exchange of private goods), the reservation utility would take the
form b () = (ˆ ) + b. In general, the functions ˆ () and b () depend
on both the property rights and assumptions about bargaining, but for much
of our analysis we will take these functions as given.
Given these functions and the resulting reservation utility, the (interim)
individual rationality constraints of agent  can be written as
E[(( ˜−) ) +  ( ˜−)] ≥ E[b( ˜−)] for all  (1)
We will say that a property rights mechanism permits eﬃcient bargaining if
it induces functions {ˆ(·)b(·)}=1 such that there exists a budget-balanced,
incentive-compatible, and individually rational mechanism implementing an
eﬃcient decision rule ∗(·).
3 An Ineﬃciency Theorem
In this section, we provide a set of suﬃcient conditions ensuring that eﬃcient
bargaining is impossible given a set of initial property rights. Our result will
have Myerson and Satterthwaite’s (1983) result, and several others, as special
cases.
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3.1 Characterization of Intermediary Profits
It will prove convenient to focus on mechanisms in which, for some vector of
types (ˆ1  ˆ), payments take the following form:
 (|ˆ) =
X
 6=
 (∗ ()  )−(ˆ) (2)
where (ˆ) = E[ (ˆ ˜−)− b(ˆ ˜−)] (3)
Note that these payments describe a Vickey-Clarke-Groves (“VCG”) mecha-
nism [see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), Chapter 23]. The portion
of the payment that depends the agents’ announcements,
P
 6=  (∗ ()  ),
causes each agent  to fully internalize his eﬀect on aggregate surplus, thereby
inducing him to announce his true type and implementing the eﬃcient al-
location rule ∗(·). The fixed participation fee (ˆ), on the other hand,
equals type ˆ’s expected gain from participating in the mechanism absent
the fixed charge, so it causes that type’s IR constraint to hold with equality.
If we imagine that there is an intermediary in charge of this trading process,
its expected profit with this mechanism, assuming all agents participate, is
given by
(ˆ) = E
"X

 (˜|ˆ)
#
=
ÃX

E[ (ˆ ˜−)− b(ˆ ˜−)]!− ( − 1)E[ (˜)] (4)
To ensure that all types participate, the participation fee for each agent
 can be at most inf ˆ∈Θ(ˆ), resulting in an expected profit for the inter-
mediary of
 ≡ inf
ˆ∈Θ
(ˆ) (5)
If there exists a type ˆ achieving the infimum, i.e.,
ˆ ∈ arg min∈Θ E
h
 ( ˜−)− b( ˜−)i 
it will be called agent ’s critical type. This is a type that has the lowest net
expected participation surplus in the mechanism.
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The sign of the expected profit (5) determines whether property rights
permit eﬃcient bargaining:6
Lemma 1 (i) Any property rights mechanism at which  ≥ 0 permits ef-
ficient bargaining. (ii) If, moreover, for each agent , Θ is a smoothly
connected subset of a Euclidean space, and  ( ) is diﬀerentiable in 
with a bounded gradient on ×Θ, then a property rights mechanism permits
eﬃcient bargaining only if  ≥ 0
3.1.1 Adverse eﬃcient-opt-out Types
For each agent , let
b− () ≡X
 6=
 (ˆ ()  )− b ()
denote the joint payoﬀ of agents other than  when agent  chooses not to
participate in the bargaining mechanism. (Observe that we assume there is
budget balance in the event of nonparticipation, so that the collective transfer
to agents other than  when agent  opts out is −b ().) Since  () is the
maximal achievable surplus in state , we have:
b ()+b− () =X

 (ˆ ()  ) ≤
X

 (∗ ()  ) =  () for all  ∈ Θ
(6)
Definition 2 Given a property rights mechanism, type  of agent  is an
eﬃcient-opt-out type if ˆ( −) = ∗( −) for all −.
Note that if  is an eﬃcient-opt-out type, then  ( −) = b( −) +b−( −) for all −. That is, there are never any gains from trade between
type  and the other agents, regardless of their types.
6Versions of this result appear, for example, in Makowski and Mezzetti (1994), Krishna
and Perry (1998), Neeman (1999), Williams (1999), Che (2006), Schweizer (2006), Figueroa
and Skreta (2008), Segal and Whinston (2011), and Segal and Whinston (2013). Part (i)
of the Lemma can be proven by building a budget-balanced mechanism as suggested
by Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979), and satisfying all agents’
participation constraints with appropriate lump-sum transfers. Part (ii) follows from the
classical Revenue Equivalence Theorem.
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Definition 3 Given a property rights mechanism, type  of agent  is an
adverse type if it minimizes E[b−( ˜−)]
Type  is an adverse type if, conditional on agent  opting out, agents
other than  are worst oﬀ collectively when agent ’s type is . Note in
particular that any type  is trivially an adverse type when agent  imposes
no externalities on the other agents, so b− () does not depend on . This
is the case, for example, with simple property rights.
Example 4 Suppose that each of two agents  = 1 2 has a value  for an
object, where  is drawn from distribution . Agent 1 faces a liability rule
and pays agent 2 price  ∈ [0 1] if he chooses to take the object In this case,b1(1 2) = max{1 −  0} and b2(1 2) = 21() + (1 − 1()). Then
agent 2’s type 2 =  is an eﬃcient-opt-out type, since when he has this value
the outcome of agent 1’s exercise decision is eﬃcient regardless of agent 1’s
type. That type of agent 2 is trivially an adverse type because agent 1’s
payoﬀ when exercising the option does not depend on agent 2’s type.
On the other hand, both 1 = 1 and 1 = 0 are eﬃcient-opt-out types
for agent 1: when 1 = 1, agent 1 will always exercise under the liability
rule, and it is always eﬃcient for him to do so regardless of the other agents’
types; when instead, 1 = 0, agent 1 will never exercise under the liability
rule, which is also always eﬃcient. Of these two types, 1 = 0 is an adverse
type for agent 1 when E[2]  , since then agent 2 prefers for agent 1 to
exercise the option and agent 1 never does, while 1 = 1 is an adverse type
for agent 1 when E[2]  
The significance of these definitions for our results stems from the follow-
ing observation:
Lemma 5 When agent  has a type ◦ that is both an adverse type and an
eﬃcient-opt-out type, it is a critical type.
Proof. We can then write for all  ∈ Θ,
E
h
 (◦  ˜−)− b(◦  ˜−)i = E hb−(◦  ˜−)i
≤ E
hb−( ˜−)i
≤ E
h
 ( ˜−)− b( ˜−)i
11
where the equality is because ◦ is an eﬃcient-opt-out type, the first inequal-
ity is because ◦ is an adverse type, and the second inequality is by (6).
Our results will apply not only to settings in which adverse eﬃcient-opt-
out types exist, but also to settings in which their existence is only of the
following asymptotic form:
Definition 6 The adverse eﬃcient-opt-out property holds for agent 
if there exists a sequence { }∞=1 in Θ such that as  →∞,
E
h
 (  ˜−)− b(  ˜−)− b−(  ˜−)i → 0, and
E
hb−(  ˜−)i → infˆ∈Θ E
hb−(ˆ ˜−)i 
Note that this property holds whenever agent  has an adverse eﬃcient-
opt-out type ◦ (in which case we can let  = ◦ for all ), but it may also
hold in other cases — e.g., sometimes we may need to take a sequence with
 → +∞ (in which case we may say informally that  = +∞ is an adverse
eﬃcient-opt-out type). This property allows us to express the intermediary’s
expected profits as follows:
Lemma 7 If the adverse eﬃcient-opt-out property holds for each agent, the
intermediary’s profits (5) can be written as follows:
¯ =X

inf
ˆ∈Θ
E[b−(ˆ ˜−)]− ( − 1)E[ (˜)] (7)
Proof.
¯ = X

inf
ˆ∈Θ
E[ (ˆ ˜−)− b(ˆ ˜−)]− ( − 1)E[ (˜)]
=
X

inf
ˆ∈Θ
n
E[ (ˆ ˜−)− b(ˆ ˜−)− b−(ˆ ˜−)] + E[b−(ˆ ˜−)]o− ( − 1)E[ (˜)]
On the one hand, (6) guarantees that this expression is greater or equal to
the right-hand side of (7). On the other hand, the adverse eﬃcient-opt-out
property for agent  ensures that
inf
ˆ∈Θ
n
E[ (ˆ ˜−)− b(ˆ ˜−)− b−(ˆ ˜−)] + E[b−(ˆ ˜−)]o ≤ infˆ∈Θ E[b−(ˆ ˜−)].
Hence, if this holds for all agents, we obtain (7).
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3.2 Ineﬃciency Result
The adverse eﬃcient-opt-out property is a restrictive property, but it will
hold in a number of settings of interest. On the other hand, the second
property we require in Proposition 9 below is usually satisfied. It makes use
of the following notion:
Definition 8  ∈ R is a marginal core payoﬀ vector in state  if
(i)
P
 6= ≥ b− () for all , and
(ii)
P
 =  () 
Compared to the usual notion of the core, the marginal core considers
only coalitions that include N-1 agents. Condition (i) simply says that the
coalition consisting of all agents except agent  does not block (assuming
“blocking” yields the coalition the same collective payoﬀ it receives when
agent  opts out), while condition (ii) says that the maximal total surplus is
achieved. Using (ii), condition (i) can be rewritten as  ≤  () − b−(),
i.e., no agent  can receive more than his marginal contribution to the total
surplus.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the assumptions of Lemma 1(ii) hold, the ad-
verse eﬃcient-opt-out property holds for each agent, and the set of marginal
core payoﬀ vectors is non-empty in all states and multi-valued with a positive
probability. Then eﬃcient bargaining is impossible.
Proof. (7) implies that
¯ ≤ X

E[b−(˜)]− ( − 1)E[ (˜)]
= E
"
 (˜)−X

[ (˜)− b−(˜)]# (8)
Now, for a marginal core payoﬀ vector , for each  we have
 ≤  ()− b− () 
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If the marginal core is multi-valued, then there exists such a  with at least
one inequality strict, and so
 () =X

 
X

³
 ()− b−()´ 
If this inequality holds with positive probability, (8) implies that   0, and
so the impossibility of eﬃcient bargaining is implied by Lemma 1(ii).
3.3 Some Applications
The assumptions of Proposition 9 cover many classical economic settings.
For one example, consider the double-auction setting of Williams (1999), in
which there are  sellers with values drawn from a distribution on [ ]
and  buyers with values drawn from a distribution on [ ] with ( )∩
( ) 6= ∅. Since this is a setting without externalities, all types are trivially
adverse types. Moreover, since the IR constraints (1) imply that the functionsb−(·) have no eﬀect on whether eﬃcient bargaining can be achieved, in this
setting we can without loss assume that agents − trade eﬃciently among
themselves in the event that agent  opts out. If so, then (i) a buyer of
type  is an eﬃcient-opt-out type if either  ≤  or   , and (ii) a
seller of type  is an eﬃcient-opt-out type if either  ≥  or   .
Moreover, a competitive equilibrium exists in every state and is not unique
with a positive probability. Since a competitive equilibrium is always in the
core (and, hence, in the marginal core), Proposition 9 applies whenever both
(i) and (ii) hold.7
Proposition 9 also applies to the public good setting of Mailaith and
Postlewaite (1990), in which each of  consumers’ values is drawn from a
distribution on [0 ], and the cost of provision is   0 (whose allocation
could be assumed to be equal split among participating agents in the default
outcome). Assume (without loss of generality) that if an agent  opts out,
7The argument can also be extended to show impossibility whenever  = . In
this case, note that in an eﬃcient allocation any agent of type below  ≡ max { }
receives an object with probability zero, so is therefore indistinguishable from type , and
any agent of type above  ≡ min© ª receives an object with probability one, so is
therefore indistinguishable from type . Therefore, the profit in the mechanism must be
the same as if all agents’ types were instead distributed on the same interval
£ ¤ (with
possible atoms at its endpoints), in which case eﬃcient bargaining is impossible by the
argument in the text.
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the other agents choose the level of the public good to maximize their joint
payoﬀ, without any payment to or from agent . In this case, each agent’s
type 0 is both an eﬃcient-opt-out type and an adverse type. Since a Lindahl
equilibrium exists in every state and is not unique with a positive probability,
and a Lindahl equilibrium is in the core (and the marginal core), Proposition
9 applies.
In the double-auction setting with  buyers and  sellers, the per-
agent expected subsidy in an ex ante optimal mechanism converges to zero
as the  → ∞. Intuitively, this relates to the fact that the core converges
(in probability) to the unique competitive equilibrium of the continuous limit
economy, hence in the limit the agents can fully appropriate their marginal
contributions [as in Makowski and Ostroy (1989, 1995, 2001)]. Specifically, a
buyer’s marginal contribution, in the limit, equals his value minus the equi-
librium price, while a seller’s marginal contribution equals the equilibrium
price minus his cost. So the intermediary’s expected profit converges to zero.
This relates to the finding of Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) that the in-
eﬃciency in an ex ante optimal budget-balanced mechanism also shrinks to
zero as the number of agents grows. In contrast, in the public good setting of
Mailaith and Postlewaite (1990), the core grows in relative size as  →∞,
and ineﬃciency is exacerbated: each agent’s marginal contribution when the
good is provided and he is non-pivotal equals his value. As the number of
agents grows large, each agent becomes non-pivotal with probability one, and
the intermediary’s deficit approaches the probability of provision times the
project’s cost. In fact, as shown by Mailaith and Postlewaite (1990), the
probability of providing the public good in any budget-balanced mechanism
goes to zero.
4 Optimal Property Rights for Minimizing
the Expected First-Best Subsidy
Recall from Lemma 7 the expected subsidy needed to achieve the first best
when the adverse eﬃcient-opt-out property holds for all agents, which can
be written as:
 = inf
ˆ1ˆ
E
"
 (˜)−X

[ (˜)− b−(ˆ ˜−)]#  (9)
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Using this formula we compare property rights possessing this property in
terms of this criterion, which in general amounts to maximizing the sumP
 inf ˆ E[b−(ˆ ˜−)], or P E[b−(ˆ◦  ˜−)] when adverse eﬃcient-opt-out
types ◦1  ◦ exist for all agents. In the remainder of this section we explore
the implications of this prescription.
4.1 Two Agents
We first consider situations with two agents and analyze optimal property
rights for an indivisible good. Specifically, as in Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983), each agent ’s value  for the good is drawn from a full support
distribution  on [0 1]. We first consider which of the two agents should
own the good if the goal is to minimize the expected first-best bargaining
subsidy. We then investigate whether options to own can improve on simple
ownership. This corresponds to the legal literature’s question of whether
property rules or liability rules are better.8
4.1.1 Who Should Own?
Consider any situation with two agents in which the property rights induce a
fixed status quo (ˆb1 b), and the two agents both have eﬃcient-opt-out
types.9 We then have
b−1 (◦1 2) = 2(ˆ 2) + b2b−2 (1 ◦2) = 1(ˆ 1) + b1
and, using (9), the expected first-best subsidy is
(ˆ) = E{ (˜)− [ (˜)− b−1(◦1e2)]− [ (˜)− b−2(e1 ◦2)]}
= E{2(ˆ ˜2) + 1(ˆ ˜1) + (b1 + b2)−  (˜)}
= E{2(ˆ ˜2) + 1(ˆ ˜1)−  (˜)}  0
In words, a mediator who implements the first best must subsidize the
entire renegotiation surplus. Thus, the status quo ˆ that minimizes the
8In Section 6 we also discuss “dual chooser” rules in settings with two agents.
9Recall that with a fixed status quo, any eﬃcient-opt-out type is trivially also an adverse
type.
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expected subsidy (within a class of those that have eﬃcient-opt-out types)
must maximize the expected status quo surplus E[1(ˆe1)+2(ˆe1)]. Thus,
we have:
Proposition 10 Suppose that the assumptions of Lemma 1(ii) hold and
there are two agents. Then, the among the property rights mechanisms that
induce a fixed status quo and cause both agents to have eﬃcient-opt-out types,
the one that minimizes the first-best subsidy is the one that maximizes the
two agents’ joint payoﬀ in the absence of bargaining.
Since, as we saw in Section 3, both agents have eﬃcient-opt-out types in
the setting of Myerson and Satterthwaite, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 11 Consider the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting in which each of
two agents  = 1 2 has value  ∈ [0 1] drawn from a full support distribution
. Then assigning ownership to the agent with the higher expected value
minimizes the first-best subsidy.
Thus, to minimize the first-best bargaining subsidy, ownership is best
assigned exactly as if bargaining were impossible.
4.1.2 Property Rules vs. Liability Rules
We now consider the possibility that instead of a simple property right, one
agent may be given an option to own. Specifically, imagine that agent 1 can
choose to acquire the good from agent 2 at a price . This arrangement
may be thought of as a liability rule in which agent 1 can take the good from
agent 2, but must then make damage payment  to agent 2.
As we saw in Example 4, both agents will have adverse eﬃcient-opt-out
types in this case. For agent 2 it is his type ˆ2 = , while for agent 1 it is
his type ˆ1 = 1 if E[2]  , and type ˆ1 = 0 if E[2]   The marginal
core in this case is nonempty and is multivalued in any state  in whichb1(1)+ b2(1 2)   (); that is, whenever the exercise decision by type 1
is not eﬃcient. Hence, by Proposition 9, eﬃciency cannot be achieved with
a liability rule.
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To identify the subsidy-minimizing liability rule, we write the intermedi-
ary’s profit as
¯ = E
hb1(e1) + b2(ˆ1e2)−  (˜)i
= E
hb1(e1) + b2(e1e2)−  (˜)i| {z }
0 when option exercise is not first-best
+ E
hb2(ˆ1e2)− b2(e1e2)i| {z }
≤0 since ˆ1 is an adverse type
Observe that the first term is the expected welfare loss from agent 1’s optimal
exercise of the option. It is negative provided that agent 1’s exercise decision
is not always ex post optimal. However, the ineﬃciency is minimized when
 = E[2], which is the optimal exercise price in the absence of bargaining.
The second term, on the other hand, is non-positive, and is strictly negative
unless agent 2 is indiﬀerent, on average, about agent 1’s exercise decision.
That occurs when  = E[2]. Thus, we see that when agent 1 has the option,
the option price that minimizes the first-best subsidy has  = E[2] and it
results in a positive expected subsidy (confirming that achieving the first best
is impossible, as implied by Proposition 9).10 This option price corresponds
exactly to the traditional legal liability rule in which the damage payment
equals the victim’s expected damage.
Next, consider which agent should have the option. When agent  gets
the option and  = E[−], the first-best subsidy exactly equals the welfare
loss from agent ’s optimal exercise of the option in the absence of bargaining.
Hence, the agent  should be give the option if and only if he is best assigned
the option when bargaining is impossible.
Finally, since the case of a simple property right corresponds to setting
 = 0 or  = 1, the optimal liability rule is strictly better than the best
simple property right, exactly as in the case without bargaining.
In summary:
Proposition 12 In the Myerson and Satterthwaite setting, the option-to-
own (i.e., liability rule) that minimizes the expected first-best bargaining sub-
sidy sets the option price equal to the non-chooser’s (“victim’s”) expected
value (“harm”) and assigns the option to the agent whose optimal exercise
in the absence of bargaining results in the greatest expected surplus. The
resulting expected subsidy is lower than it is with any simple property right.
10Che (2006) also derives this result and notes the impossibility of two agents achieving
eﬃciency under a liability rule.
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4.2 More than Two Agents
When there are more than two agents, choosing the subsidy-minimizing prop-
erty rights requires that we consider the consider coalitional, rather than in-
dividual, values. For example, shifting the property right to a private good
(generating no externalities) from one agent to another is eﬃciency enhanc-
ing in the absence of bargaining if it increases the joint payoﬀ of the two
agents. In contrast, this change increases eﬃciency when bargaining is pos-
sible (in the sense of reducing the expected first-best subsidy) if it reduces
the sum of these agents’ marginal contributions to the total surplus.11
We illustrate the new eﬀects through two examples.
4.2.1 Application: Spectrum Licenses
Consider the following example: Simple property rights to two spectrum
licenses, L1 and L2, are to be allocated among three firms. Firms 1 and
2 are specialists and each firm  = 1 2 has a value  ∈ R+ for license L,
drawn from distribution  with mean , and no value for license L−. Firm
G is a generalist firm, and has a value  ∈ R+ for both licenses, and value
 for just one of the licenses, where  is drawn from distribution ,
with mean , and  ∈ (0 1) The values 1, 2, and  are independent
random variables. When   12, the licenses are complements for G; when
  12, they are substitutes. For example, the licenses might be in two
diﬀerent regions, with firms 1 and 2 being regional firms and firm G being a
national firm. In that case, G is likely to find the two licenses complements
(  12). Alternatively, the licenses might be to diﬀerent frequencies, with
firms 1 and 2 each having a product that can use either of the frequencies
eﬀectively, while firm G may have two products, each of which can use one
of the two frequencies eﬀectively. In that case, the frequencies are likely to
be substitutes (  12).
We will compare an allocation of BOTH licenses to G with an allocation
of NONE of the licenses to G (so that each license  is allocated to the
specialist firm ). Absent bargaining, the expected surplus is larger at BOTH
11This eﬀect can therefore be interpreted as the eﬀect on the two agents’ joint payoﬀ in
bargaining, if this bargaining permits each agent to extract his marginal contribution to
the grand coalition. This relates to the analysis of Segal (2003); however, the latter con-
siders the Shapley value, in which agents receive weighted combinations of their marginal
contributions to diﬀerent coalitions, hence the results are not directly comparable.
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than at ONE if
 − 2  0 (10)
Note that the best choice between these two allocations of property rights in
the absence of bargaining is independent of .
Now consider the subsidy-minimizing property rights when there is bar-
gaining. Under both of these property rights allocations, the adverse eﬃcient-
opt-out property holds. The following table summarizes the coalitional val-
ues, under the assumption that each two-agent coalition maximizes its joint
payoﬀ:
Property Rights Allocation: b− b−1 b−2
BOTH 0 max{  + 2} max{  + 1}
NONE 1 + 2 max{ 2} max{ 1}
So, BOTH is better than NONE ifX
=12
E[max{  + }]  2+
X
=12
E[max{ }]
which can be rewritten as
−2  (2−1)+
X
=12
(E[max{0 −}−E[ max{0 −(1−)}])
(11)
Thus, bargaining changes the optimal property rights according to the sign of
the term on the right-hand side of (11). This term equals zero when  = 12,
so that the licenses are neither substitutes nor complements for firm G. In
that case, the best property rights allocation is the same as in the absence
of bargaining. The derivative of the right-hand side with respect to  is

Ã
2−X
=12
[Pr( −  ≥ 0) + Pr( − (1− ) ≥ 0)]
!
 0
Thus, when   12 (substitutes), bargaining pushes the optimal property
rights toward NONE, and when   12 (complements) bargaining pushes
the optimal property rights toward BOTH.
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4.2.2 Application: Liability Rule for Pollution
Consider a setting in which agent 0 (the “firm”) chooses whether to pollute,
labeled by  ∈ {0 1}. The firm’s utility is 0 ( 0) = 0, where 0 ∈ R+
denotes its value for polluting. Agents  = 1   are consumers, whose
utilities are given by  ( ) = (1− )  with  ∈ R+. Eﬃcient pollution
is therefore given by
∗ () = 1 if and only if 0 ≥
X
≥1

We assume that, for all , ˜ has a full-support absolutely continuous distri-
bution on R+.
The property rights are given by a liability rule: the firm can choose to
pollute, in which case it must pay pre-specified “damages”  ≥ 0 to each
consumer  ≥ 1. Thus, if the firm does not participate in bargaining, it
optimally chooses ˆ0 () = ∗ (0P ), and its transfer is given by ˆ 0 () =− (P ) ˆ0 () 
We must also specify what happens if agent  ≥ 1 does not participate.
To obtain the results in the simplest possible way, we assume for now that all
the other agents then bargain eﬃciently among each other, given that agent
 must be paid compensation  if pollution is chosen. Thus, they optimally
choose pollution level ˆ () = ∗ ( −), and agent ’s compensation is
ˆ  () = ˆ (). (We will discuss the role of this assumption later.)
Given these assumptions, each agent  ≥ 1 has an eﬃcient-opt-out type
◦ = . This type is also trivially adverse, since the agent imposes no
externalities on the others. Hence, by Lemma 5, it is agent ’s critical type.
The firm, on the other hand, has two eﬃcient-opt-out types: 0 = 0
(which never pollutes in the first best and does not pollute when it does
not participate) and 0 = +∞ (which always pollutes in the first best and
pollutes when it does not participate). Furthermore, 0 = 0 is an adverse type
if
P
≥1  ≥ E[
P
≥1 ˜] while 0 = +∞ is an adverse type if the inequality
is reversed. (Of course, formally speaking 0 = +∞ is not a “type,” but
taking a sequence 0 → +∞ shows that the firm does satisfy the adverse
eﬃcient-opt-out property.)
Remark 13 How would this conclusion be aﬀected if agent  ≥ 1 expected
a diﬀerent outcome ˆ () from non-participation, while still expecting com-
pensation ˆ  () = ˆ− () according to the liability rule? Observe that the
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reservation utility of type  =  is independent of ˆ (). Since type  = 
was agent ”s critical type above, where eﬃcient bargaining was impossible,
the participation constraints of this type continue to imply that eﬃcient bar-
gaining is impossible.
Furthermore, we can argue that if the intermediary can choose ˆ () fol-
lowing nonparticipation of agent  ≥ 1 to minimize the expected first-best
subsidy, then it can do no better than setting ˆ () = ∗ ( −), as we
assumed above Indeed, since the intermediary has to satisfy the participa-
tion constraint of type  =  regardless of ˆ (), formula (7) bounds be-
low the intermediary’s expected subsidy. On the other hand, by choosing
ˆ () = ∗ ( −) the intermediary ensures that type  =  is a critical
type, and therefore its participation constraints imply all the other types’ par-
ticipation constraints, so the lower bound on the expected subsidy is actually
achieved. Therefore, the following analysis of optimal damages  applies to
the situation where the intermediary can choose ˆ () optimally following
nonparticipation by individual agents.
Now we identify the vector of damages  = (1  ) that minimizes
the expected first-best subsidy. Using (7), the maximization problem can be
written as
max1≥0
X
=0
E
hb−(◦  ˜−)i
where
E
hb−0(◦0 ˜−0)i = min
(X
≥1
E[˜]
X
≥1

)
and
E
hb−(◦  ˜−)i = E
"
max
(
˜0 − 
X
 6=, ≥1
˜
)#
for  ≥ 1
Note that using the Envelope Theorem, for  ≥ 1,
E
hb−(◦  ˜−)i
 = −Pr
(
˜0 −  
X
 6=, ≥1
˜
)
∈ (−1 0) , (12)
while
E
hb−0(◦0 ˜−0)i
 =
½
1 if
P
≥1 E[˜] 
P
≥1 
¾
.
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Therefore, at the optimum we must have
P
≥1  =
P
≥1 E[˜], i.e., the
total damages paid by the firm should equal the total expectation damages for
the aﬀected parties. This would also be optimal in a setting where bargaining
is impossible.
However, in contrast to the setting without bargaining, it now matters
how the damages are allocated among consumers. The problem of optimal
allocation of damages can be formulated as
max1≥0
X
≥1
E[b− ³ ˜−´] s.t. X
≥1
 =
X
≥1
E[˜]
Note by (12), E[b−( ˜−)] is nondecreasing in , so the objective
function is convex, and is therefore maximized at a vertex of the feasible set,
i.e., a point  such that ∗ =P≥1 E[˜] for
∗ ∈ argmax≥1
(
E
"b− ÃX
≥1
E[˜] ˜−
!#
+
X
≥16=
E
hb−(0 ˜−)i)
and  = 0 for all  6= ∗. Thus, all of the damages should be paid to a
single consumer, with the consumer selected to maximize the total expected
surplus of the  coalitions consisting of the firm and  − 1 aﬀected parties.
5 Optimal Property Rights with Second-Best
Bargaining
In many circumstances, there isn’t an intermediary available to subsidize
trade. In that case, a more appropriate approach to determining optimal
property rights involves looking at second-best mechanisms that maximize
expected surplus subject to a budget balance constraint. Analyzing that
problem, however, is complicated by the interplay between the mechanism
chosen and the agents’ critical types: those critical types depend on the
mechanism being employed, but the best mechanism depends on the agent’s
critical types (because they determine which IR constraints bind).12 In this
section, we analyze this problem. As this is a much harder problem than
the first-best problem studied earlier, we restrict attention to the case of
12For any mechanism, not just VCG mechanisms, we now refer to an agent’s “critical
type” as a type that has the smallest participation surplus among all of the agent’s types.
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two agents trading a single indivisible good, where those agents’ types are
independently distributed on [0 1].13
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) characterized the optimal second-best
mechanism for the case of simple property rights, where one agent is a seller
(the initial owner) and the other agent is the buyer. The optimal mechanism
when agent 2 is the seller and agents’ types are uniformly distributed is shown
in Figure 1 [the shaded region shows the type profiles (1 2) at which agent
1 ends up getting the good], which leads to a surplus loss of 764 (from
the first-best surplus of 34). It involves a trading “gap”  = 14, which
represents the amount that the buyer’s value must exceed the seller’s value
for trade to occur. Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) showed that
the first best is achievable for a convex set of intermediate property rights
if dividing or randomizing property rights is possible [see also Segal and
Whinston (2011)]. However, when divided or randomized property rights are
not possible, it may be possible to improve upon simple undivided property
rights with more complex property rights mechanisms. In the remainder of
this section, we examine this possibility for liability rules.
5.1 Characterization of the Second-best BargainingMech-
anism for a Given Liability Rule
Without loss of generality, we will take the agent who possesses the option
to have the good to be agent 1 (the “active agent”); agent 2 is the “passive
agent” or “victim.” Note that if  = 0 then agent 1 will always exercise his
option in the default, so this liability rule is equivalent to agent 1 being the
owner with a simple property right. If, instead,  = 1, then agent 1 will
never exercise his option, so the liability rule is then equivalent to agent 2
being the owner with a simple property right. Hence, the optimal liability
rule cannot be worse than the optimal simple property right. However, we
will see that there are always some liability rules that are worse than the
best simple property right.
Our analysis hinges on identifying critical types. For the passive agent 2,
we can observe that any type 2 whose probability of trade in the mechanism
is  is a critical type. Indeed, any other type 02 can guarantee the same
participation surplus by pretending to be type 2 since the probability of
trade in the mechanism then exactly equals the probability of trade if agent
13The restriction to [0 1] is just a normalization.
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Figure 1: The second-best optimal (Myerson-Satterthwaite) mechanism
when agent 1 (the buyer) and agent 2 (the seller) both have values that
are uniformly distributed on the interval [0 1].
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2 refuses to participate. As a result, if type 2 is willing to participate, then
so is every type. In general, however, there will not be a single critical type
for agent 2 but an interval
£2 ¯2¤ of them.
As for the active agent 1, we observe that this agent’s critical types always
include either ˆ1 = 0, or ˆ1 = 1, or both. To see this, observe that in the
default outcome this agent’s payoﬀ is 1(1) = max{1 −  0}, which is a
convex function whose derivative is 0 below  and 1 above . This agent’s
expected payoﬀ 1(1) in any mechanism, on the other hand, has a derivative
 01(1) at each 1 that equals that type’s expected probability of receiving the
good in the mechanism, so  01(1) ∈ [0 1] for all 1. Thus, if 1(1) = 1(1)
at some 1, then this must be true at either 1 = 0 or at 1 = 1 (or at both).
In what follows, we consider the general case in which the c.d.f.’s of the
two agents’ types are 1 2 respectively, with strictly positive densities 1 2.
For  = 1 2, and for  ∈ [0 1] let
 (|) ≡  − 1− ()() and ¯ (|) ≡  + 
()
()
denote agent ’s virtual values when his downward/upward ICs bind. We
assume that both  (·|1) and ¯ (·|1) are strictly increasing and continuous
functions in  (this implies the same properties for any  ∈ [0 1]). Note that
 (|) ≤  ≤ ¯ (|) 
and that the inequalities are strict for  ∈ (0 1), provided that   0.
Also, for  ∈ [0 1], let agent 1’s weighted virtual value be
1 (1| ) ≡ (1− )1 (1|) + ¯1 (1|) 
In our characterization, the weight  will equal 0 when 1 = 0 is a critical
type for agent 1 (so that his downward IC constraints bind), and will equal 1
when 1 = 1 is a critical type (so that agent 1’s upward incentive constraints
bind). We can have  ∈ (0 1) when both of these types are critical for agent
1.
Finally, for  ∈ [0 1] and  ∈ [0 1], define ¯1 (2| ) ≡ −11 (¯2(2|)| )
and 1 (2| ) ≡ −11 (2(2|)| ). Given an agent 2 type 2, and values and , these are the types for agent 1 at which agent 1’s weighted virtual
valuation equals agent 1’s upward and downward virtual values, respectively.
They will form part of the boundary of the set of type profiles at which
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Figure 2: The types ¯1 (2| ) and 1 (2| ), and the boundary ˆ1 (2) of
Lemma 14.
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agent 1 gets the good in the optimal mechanism, and are depicted in Figure
2. Under our assumptions they are both continuous increasing functions
and ¯1 (2| ) ≥ 1 (2| ) for all 2.
We begin with the following characterization result (all proofs for results
in this section are in the Appendix):
Lemma 14 When there is a liability rule in which agent 1 has the option to
own in return for a payment of  ∈ [0 1], the second-best solution takes the
following form (with probability 1): For some fixed  and 
1 (1 2) =
½
1 for 1  ˆ1 (2) 
0 for 1  ˆ1 (2)  (13)
where
ˆ1 (2) ≡ max©1 (2| ) min© ¯1 (2| )ªª . (14)
Furthermore,
E[ˆ1(˜2)− ] ≥ 0 and (1− )E[ˆ1(˜2)− ] ≤ 0. (15)
In Figure 2, the function ˆ1(2) defined in (14), which forms the boundary
of the region in which agent 1 gets the good in the mechanism, is shown in
heavy trace.
Condition (15) reflects agent 1’s IR constraint. Under the liability rule,
agent 1’s utility is exactly 1− larger when he is type 1 than when he is type
0. On the other hand, the diﬀerence in expected payoﬀs for types 1 = 1
and 1 = 0 equals 1−E[ˆ1(˜2)] in the mechanism.14 Thus, type 1 = 0 must
be a critical type for agent 1 when E[ˆ1(˜2)]  .
14To see this, observe that by the Envelope Theorem, this diﬀerence in expected payoﬀs
in the mechanism equals Z 1
0
ÃZ ˆ2(1)
0
2(2)2
!
1
where ˆ2(·) = min{2 : ˆ1(2) = 1}. But, reversing the order of integration, this can be
rewritten as Z 1
0
ÃZ 1
ˆ1(2)
1
!
2(2)2 = 1− E[ˆ1(2)]
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For the specific case in which both agents’ types are drawn from the uni-
form distribution, this characterization implies that the second-best mecha-
nism takes the following form:
Proposition 15 When both agents’ types are drawn from the uniform dis-
tribution and there is a liability rule in which agent 1 has the option to own
in return for a payment of  ∈ [0 1], the optimal second-best allocation rule
takes the following form, for some function ():
• For   38: 1(1 2) = 1 if and only if (i) min{1 } ≥ 2, (ii)
1 ≥  and 2 ∈ [ + ()], or (iii) 1 ≥ 2 − () and 2  + ();
• For  ∈ [38 58]: 1(1 2) = 1 if and only if (i) 1 ≥ 2 + () and
2  38, (ii) 1 ≥  and 2 ∈ [38 58] or (iii) 1 ≥ 2 − () and
2  58;
• For   58: 1(1 2) = 1 if and only if (i) 1 ≥ 2 ≥ , (ii) 1 ≥ 
and 2 ∈ [ − ()], or (iii) 1 ≥ 2 + () and 2  − ().
Figures 3-5 show the sets of types for which agent 1 receives the good for
the three cases identified in Proposition 15. The three cases correspond to
situations in which agent 1’s critical type is ˆ1 = 1 (for   38), ˆ1 = 0
(for   58), and both types 0 and 1 are critical types (for  ∈ [38 58]).
Note that the critical type is 1 (resp. 0) for low (resp. high) , which are
cases where the property right is relatively close to agent 1 (resp. 2) having a
simple ownership right.15 The “gap” function () is similar to the Myerson-
Satterthwaite gap seen in Figure 1, and like that gap its size is set to achieve
budget balance.
5.2 Second-best Surplus Given Option Price 
The second-best expected surplus as a function of  can be derived analyti-
cally in the case in which both agents’ values are uniformly distributed (see
the Appendix for its derivation). Figure 6 graphs the resulting second-best
15To compare these figures to Figure 2, note that in the special case of the uniform
distribution, 1(2| 0) = 2 and 1(2| 1) = 2 for all 2.
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Figure 3: The second-best mechanism for   38 when both agents’ values
are uniformly distributed on the interval [0 1].
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Figure 4: The second-best mechanism for 38    58 when both agents’
values are uniformly distributed on the interval [0 1].
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Figure 5: The second-best mechanism for   58 when both agents’ values
are uniformly distributed on the interval [0 1].
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ineﬃciency as a function of . For comparison, the figure also shows the inef-
ficiency with no bargaining and the deficit for a planner who would subsidize
trade to achieve the first best. As can be seen in the figure, the optimal
property right has  = 12 — equal to the expected value of the passive agent
— in all three cases.
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Expected Ineﬃciency if there were No Bargaining (dashed curve)
Expected Ineﬃciency in Second-Best Bargaining (solid curve)
While the optimal second-best  is the same as when bargaining is not
possible and as when there is an intermediary willing to subsidize trade,
Figure 6 shows one significant diﬀerence between the second-best case and
these others: the surplus achievable with a liability rule is not monotone
increasing as  moves toward 12, and is in fact lower for  close to 0 (resp.
1) than at  = 0 (resp. 1). That is, a slightly interior  is worse than the
simple property right it is near.16 The fact that liability rules which induce
16In contrast, Lemma 19 in the Appendix shows that in the case of randomized simple
property rights the set of status quos for which first-best is achieved is convex [the set is
nonempty by Segal and Whinston (2011)], and that a move in the direction of this set
raises the second-best expected surplus. Loertscher and Wasser (2014) characterizes the
second-best optimal bargaining mechanism with simple property rights when the first best
is not attainable, including for cases with more than two agents.
33
default allocations close to but diﬀerent from a simple property right are
worse than that simple property right does not depend on our assumption
of a uniform distribution. As the following proposition shows, it is true for
any distributions of values for the two agents:
Proposition 16 There exists a   0 such that any liability rule with  ∈
[1 1−] (resp,  ∈ [0 ]) has a lower second-best expected surplus than  = 1
(resp.  = 0), which is equivalent to simple ownership by agent 2 (resp. agent
1).
To understand Proposition 16, note that starting at  = 1 a small re-
duction in  weakly increases the default payoﬀ of every type of the active
agent 1. At the same time, it increases the expected payoﬀ in the default to
essentially all types of the passive agent 2 (whose default payoﬀ when  = 1
simply equals his type), since he then gains (− 2)[1−1()].17 Thus, this
change tightens IR constraints, reducing the achievable second-best surplus.
We have also explored computationally a range of cases in which the two
agents’ values are drawn from diﬀering distributions. In general, it is not the
case that the optimal option price  equals the victim’s expected harm, E[2].
Figure 7 illustrates this fact for an example in which the active agent’s (agent
1) value has density 1(1) = 02 + 16(1) while the passive agent’s (agent
2) value is uniformly distributed. The figure plots the expected surplus with
the second-best mechanism for each  ∈ [045 055] in increments of 0.001.
The optimal  is 0.516. The expected surplus at this  is 0.726996, compared
to the expected surplus of 0.726881 when  = 05 = E[2].18 Interestingly,
just as in this example, in all of the cases we have computed, the optimal
option price  is extremely close to the victim’s expected harm and the loss
from setting instead  = E[2] is very small.19
17The complication in the proof is that this is not true for type 2 = 1 (or types near it
for   1).
18As a check that this finding is not a result of computational imprecisions, we also
examined the case in which we switched the two agents value distributions, as well as
other cases with linear density functions for agent 2. For such cases, we know that the
optimal  in fact equals E[2] (see Lemma 18 in the Appendix). Our computational
algorithm yields an optimal  exactly equal to E[2] in all of these cases.
19Unfortunately, we have been unable to produce an analytical result showing that this
is generally true.
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Figure 6: Welfare as a function of  in an example in which the active agent’s
value is distributed with density 1(1) = 02+16(1) and the passive agent’s
value is uniformly distributed. The optimal  diﬀers from 1/2, the expected
value of the passive agent’s value.
6 Dual-Chooser Rules
For another application, in this section we consider whether “dual-chooser”
rules, as described by Ayres (2005), can improve upon simple property rights
or liability rules when there are two agents. In a dual chooser rule, one agent
(we will assume agent 2) is the initial owner of the good, but the other agent
can get it if both agents agree to this at a pre-specified price .
We assume that both agents’ values for the good are independently drawn
from the same interval, which we normalize to be [0 1]. Our first observa-
tion is that with this property rights mechanism, agent 2’s type ˆ2 = 1 is
an adverse eﬃcient-opt-out type, while agent 1’s type ˆ1 = 0 is an adverse
eﬃcient-opt-out type (these types never trade, either in the default mecha-
nism or in the eﬃcient mechanism). Since these types have the same reserva-
tion utilities as in the standard Myerson-Satterthwaite setting in which agent
2 is the owner, we see immediately that the expected first-best subsidy is the
same as in the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting, regardless of .
As for the second-best expected surplus, observe that for no  can it
exceed that in the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting where agent 2 has a simple
property right because, for any , the participation constraints of types ˆ2 = 1
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and ˆ1 = 0 must still be satisfied, and the reservation utilities of these types
are the same as in the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting. On the other hand,
the second-best expected surplus can be strictly lower than in the Myerson-
Satterthwaite setting. For example,
Proposition 17 If ˜1 ˜2 ∼  [0 1], then the Myerson-Satterthwaite mech-
anism fails to satisfy IR for any dual-chooser rule with posted price  ∈¡
0 1
2
¢ ∪ ¡1
2
 1¢.
Proof. Consider first agent 1. His expected utility in the dual-chooser rule
is b1 (1) = max {0 (1 − ) }, while his expected utility in the Myerson-
Satterthwaite mechanism is 1 (1) = (1 − 14)2+ 2 (this can be calculated
either from the dominant-strategy “pricing” implementation of this allocation
rule, or by the integral formula using the allocation rule). So clearly for
  14, the IR of 1 = 14 will fail. For 14 ≤   12, consider instead
type 1 =  + 14 (this will actually be the “critical type”). For this type
the participation surplus is 22− 4 =  (− 12) 2  0.
Now consider agent 2. His expected utility in the dual-chooser rule isb2 (2) = 2 + max {0 (1− ) (− 2)}. while his expected utility in the
M-S mechanism is 2 (2) = 2 + (34− 2)2+ 2. So clearly for   34, the
IR of 2 = 34 will fail. For 12   ≤ 34, consider type 2 = − 14 (this
will actually be the “critical type”). For this type the participation surplus
is (1− )2 2− (1− ) 4 = (1− ) (12− ) 2  0.
We see then that when bargaining under asymmetric information will take
place (of the form we have considered), dual chooser rules cannot improve
upon simple property rights, and can be worse. (They must therefore also be
weakly worse than the best liability rule.) This can be contrasted with the
case in which bargaining is impossible, where for any  ∈ (0 1) the surplus is
strictly higher under a dual chooser rule than under a simple property right.
7 Conclusion
The critical role of property rights for economic eﬃciency has long been
recognized. In this paper, we shed new light on this role, by examining how
property rights aﬀect eﬃciency when agents will bargain under conditions of
asymmetric information.
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Our results have implications for several literatures. Relative to the theo-
retical mechanism design literature, we provide a new set of suﬃcient condi-
tions characterizing when eﬃciency through bargaining is impossible, which
applies not only to the traditional case of simple property rights, but also to
more general property rights mechanisms. We then show how eﬃciency is
aﬀected by the property rights allocation in such cases.
In organizational economics, losses due to ex post bargaining ineﬃciencies
were a central theme of Williamson’s Transaction Cost Economics approach
to the firm. One can view our analysis, in which we study how property rights
can aﬀect those losses, as taking the Grossman-Hart-Moore [Grossman and
Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart (1995)] Property Rights Theory
approach of asking how asset ownership aﬀects eﬃciency, but doing so focus-
ing instead on Williamson’s costs of haggling, rather than on ineﬃciencies
in ex ante investments. Like the Property Rights Theory, our approach has
implications not only for asset ownership, but also for allocation of decision
rights within firms.
Finally, in the legal literature, ever since Calebresi and Malemud (1972),
scholars have been interested in the performance of diﬀerent property rights
regimes. Our results shed new light on this issue when bargaining is im-
perfect due to the presence of asymmetric information. In particular, we
have highlighted the eﬀect that bargaining has on the choice among property
rights regimes, relative to the case in which bargaining is impossible.
8 Appendix: Proofs
8.1 Proof of Lemma 14
Proof. Note than in any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, agent 2’s
expected consumption 1−[1(˜1 2)]must be nondecreasing in 2, therefore
there will be a type ˆ2 such thatn
1− 1 ()−[1(˜1 2)]
o
(2 − ˆ2) ≥ 0 for all 2 (16)
Consider the designer’s “relaxed problem” in which she chooses ˆ2, the al-
location rule  (·), and interim expected utilities 1 (·), 2 (·) to maximize
expected surplus subject to (16), expected budget balance, first-order incen-
tive compatibility (ICFOC), agent 1’s participation constraints IR1 (0) and
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IR1 (1), and agent 2’s participation constraint IR2(ˆ2).20 The Lagrangian for
this problem (leaving ICFOC as constraints) is

h
˜11(˜) + ˜2(1− 1(˜))
i
+
h
(˜2)(1− 1 ()− 1(˜))(e2 − ˆ2)i
+
n
[˜11(˜) + ˜2(1− 1(˜))]−[1(˜1)]−[2(˜2)]
o
+01 (0) + 1 (1 (1)− (1− )) + [2(ˆ2)− [1− 1()]− ˆ21()]
s.t. ICFOC
It is easy to see that   0 (since the first-best is impossible), while 0 1 ≥ 0
must satisfy the complementary slackness conditions
01 (0) = 0 and 1 [1 (1)− (1− )] = 0 (17)
and  (·) ≥ 0 must satisfy the complementary slackness conditions
 (2)
n
[1(˜1 2)]− (1− 1 ())
o
= 0 for all 2 6= ˆ2 (18)
Note that the solution must have  =  (otherwise we could raise the
Lagrangian by adding a constant to 2 (·) without aﬀecting ICFOC), and
0 + 1 =  (otherwise we could raise the Lagrangian by adding a constant
to 1 (·) without aﬀecting ICFOC). Hence, we can rewrite the Lagrangian as
(1 + )
h
˜11(˜) + ˜2(1− 1(˜))
i
+
h
(˜2)(1− 1 ()− 1(˜))(e2 − ˆ2)i
−
µ− 1

¶n
[1(˜1)]− 1 (0)
o
− 
³1

´n
[1(˜1)]− 1 (1) + 1− 
o
−
n
[2(˜2)]− 2(ˆ2)
o
− 
n
[1− 1()] + ˆ21()
o
Note also that we can always satisfy one of the complementary slackness
conditions (17) by adding a constant to 1 (·). To be able to satisfy both of
them at the same time while satisfying IR1 (1) and IR1 (0), we need to be in
one of the following three cases: (i) 0 1  0 implies 1 (1)−1 (0) = 1−,
20By standard arguments that adjust the transfer rule [e.g., Lemma 1 in Segal and
Whinston (2011)], ex ante budget balance can be strengthened to ex post budget balance
without aﬀecting expected surplus or any of the other constraints. Moreover, provided
that the allocation rule is monotone, all IC and IR constraints will be satisfied for the
reasons stated in text.
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(ii) 1 = 0 implies 0 =   0 hence 1 (0) = 0 and 1 (1) − 1 (0) =1 (1) ≥ 1 − , or (iii) 0 = 0 implies 1 =  hence 1 (1) = 1 −  and1 (1)− 1 (0) = 1− − 1 (0) ≤ 1− .
For now, fix ˆ2 and consider maximizing with respect to the allocation
rule 1(·) the simplified Lagrangian (which drops all terms not involving the
allocation rule)
(1 + )
h
˜11(˜) + ˜2(1− 1(˜))
i
−
h
(˜2)1(˜)(e2 − ˆ2)i
−
µ− 1

¶n
[1(˜1)]− 1 (0)
o
− 
³1

´n
[1(˜1)]− 1 (1) + 1− 
o
−
n
[2(˜2)]− 2(ˆ2)
o
Now using ICFOC and integration by parts, dividing by 1 +  and let-
ting ˆ ≡  (1 + ), ˆ (2) ≡  (2)  (1 + ) and  ≡ 1, this simplified
Lagrangian can be rewritten as

"
1(˜1|ˆ )1(˜) +
n
1{˜2 ≥ ˆ2}2(˜2|ˆ) + 1{2  ˆ2}¯2(˜2|ˆ)
o
(1− 1(˜))
−(2 − ˆ2)(˜2)1(˜)
#

It is maximized pointwise by a solution of the form (13), where
ˆ1 (2) =
½ −11 (¯2(2|ˆ)− ˆ (2) |ˆ ) for 2  ˆ2
−11 (2(2|ˆ) + ˆ (2) |ˆ ) for 2  ˆ2 (19)
Let ¯2(1| ) ≡ {2 : 1 (2| ) = 1} and 2(1| ) ≡ {2 : ¯1 (2| ) =1}, and define ¯2 ≡ ¯2(|ˆ ) and 2 ≡ 2(|ˆ ). Note that under our as-
sumptions we have 2 ≤ ¯2. Observe that by (16) and the definition of 2 ¯2,
we have ˆ1 (2) ≤   ¯1 (2| ) for all 2 ∈ (2 ˆ2) and ˆ1 (2) ≥  1 (2| ) for all 2 ∈ (ˆ2 ¯2). This in turn implies, using (19), that for all2 ∈ (min{2 ˆ2}max{ˆ2 ¯2}) we have ˆ (2)  0 and therefore for all such2, by (18), [1(˜1 2)] = 1− 1 (), which implies ˆ1 (2) = .
Next, for 2  min{2 ˆ2}, ˆ (2) ≥ 0 implies that ˆ1 (2) ≤ ¯1 (2| ) , therefore [1(˜1 2)]  1 − 1 (), and so by (18) ˆ (2) = 0, implying
ˆ1 (2) = ¯1 (2| ). Similarly for 2  max{ˆ2 ¯2}, ˆ (2) ≥ 0 implies that
ˆ1 (2) ≥ 1 (2| )  , therefore [1(˜1 2)]  1−1 ()  and so by (18)
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ˆ (2) = 0, implying ˆ1 (2) = 1 (2| ). Thus, the solution takes the form
ˆ1 (2) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
¯1 (2| ) for 2  min{2 ˆ2}
 for 2 ∈ (min{2 ˆ2}max{ˆ2 ¯2})
1 (2| ) for 2  max{ˆ2 ¯2}
(20)
Now consider optimal choice of ˆ2: since the solution for ˆ2  2 or ˆ2  ¯2
is feasible in the problem for ˆ2 ∈ £2 ¯2¤ (while the converse is not true), it
is optimal to choose ˆ2 ∈ £2 ¯2¤, in which case the function ˆ1 (2) is given
by (14).
The complementary slackness conditions (17) are given by (15), since by
ICFOC and Fubini’s Theorem
1 (1)−1 (0) =
Z 1
0
[1(1 ˜2)]1 = 
∙Z 1
0
1(1 ˜2)1
¸
= 1−[ˆ1(˜2)]
(21)
Finally, note that the constructed solution actually satisfies all the incen-
tive constraints (since for each , ˜−[( ˜−)] is nondecreasing in ) and
all of the participation constraints (by the argument in the text before the
proposition).
We now describe a transfer rule that implements the allocation rule
above in a dominant strategy IC mechanism that has the right participa-
tion constraints binding. When   1, i.e., IR1 (0) binds, we let 1 (1 2) =
−ˆ1 (2)1 (1 2) — i.e., agent 1 pays ˆ1 (2) when he consumes the object.21
When   0, i.e., IR1 (1) binds, we let 1 (1 2) = −+(1− 1 (1 2)) ˆ1 (2)
— i.e., agent 1 first takes the object at  and then is paid ˆ1 (2) when he gives
it up.22 For  ∈ (0 1), by (15) the two payments have the same expectation
over 2 for every 2. In particular, in that case we can elect the first option
for 1 when 1   and the second option when 1  , yielding transfer rule
2 (1 2) =
½ −ˆ1 (2)1 (1 2) if 1  
−+ (1− 1 (1 2)) ˆ1 (2) if 1  
¾
(22)
21Since 1(0 2) = 1 for all 2 when   1 , type 0 of agent 1 has an expected payoﬀ of
0.
22Since 1(0 2) = 0 for all 2 when   1 , type 1 of agent 1 has an expected payoﬀ of
1− .
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As for agent 2, we let
2 (1 2) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
2
³
1|ˆ 
´
1 (1 2) if 1  
− ¯2
³
1|ˆ 
´
(1− 1 (1 2)) if 1  
⎫
⎬
⎭ (23)
That is, if agent 1 would not exercise his option at the default, then agent
2 receives 2
³
1|ˆ 
´
whenever he sells the object, while if agent 1 would
exercise his option at the default, then agent 2 receives  but pays back
¯2
³
1|ˆ 
´
whenever he ends up keeping the object.23
Adding the two transfer rules (22) and (23) yields a budget deficit ofh
2
³
1|ˆ 
´
− ˆ1 (2)
i
1 (1 2) when 1   (24)
[ˆ1 (2)− ¯2
³
1|ˆ 
´
] (1− 1 (1 2)) when 1  
8.2 Lemma 18
Lemma 18 Suppose that agent 1’s type 1 is uniformly distributed and let
ˆ1(2|) describe the second-best allocation rule given  [as specified in (14)].
Then, if for any  and 0 both IR1(0) and IR1(1) bind in the optimal second-
best mechanism, then ˆ1(2|0) = ˆ1(2|)+ (0− ). Among such , expected
surplus is maximized by setting  = (2).
Proof. Define the two regions  ≡ { : 1 ∈ (ˆ1(2|) )} and  ≡ { :
( ˆ1(2|))}. By (15), the probabilities of these two regions must be equal
(these are the two regions in which the final allocation diﬀers fromwhat would
happen if agent 1 simply exercised his option optimally). Observe that with
a constant shift in ˆ1(2) budget balance is preserved: For every state  in
region , the deficit is now exactly  smaller, while for every state  in region
, the deficit is now exactly  larger. Given the uniform distribution of 1
and the fact that we integrate in each case over the same sets of 2, this change
has no eﬀect on the expected deficit. Thus, if ˆ1(2|) maximizes expected
23Observe that with this payment rule, type ˆ2 of agent 2 has expected payoﬀ ˆ21()
+[1− 1()], so IR2(ˆ2) holds with equality.
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surplus with budget balance under default , then ˆ1(2|0) = ˆ1(2|)+(0−
) must do so under default 0.
Next, observe that the optimal mechanism in the region in which IR1(0)
and IR1(1) both bind therefore [again, given the uniform distribution of 1]
has a constant improvement in expected surplus over the expected surplus
arising when agent 1 simply exercises his option optimally. Since the latter
expected surplus is maximized at  = 12, so is the former.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 15
Consider the special case of 1 2 being uniform on [0 1], in which
 (|) = (1 + )  −  and ¯ (|) = (1 + )  (25)
Then we have
2 (1) = 1 − 
¯2 (1) = 1 + ¯
¯1(2) = 2 + 
1(2) = 2 − ¯
and
ˆ1 (2) = min©max©2 − ¯ ª  2 + ª ,
where  =  (1− )  (1 + ) and ¯ =  (1 + ).
8.3.1 Only IR1(0) binds
Now consider the relaxed problem in which we ignore IR1 (1). The solution
to that problem corresponds to the case in which  = 0, hence ¯ = 0 Let
 =  =  (1 + ). We can use the following transfer for agent 1:
1 (1 2) = −ˆ1 (2)1 (1 2) when 1  
1 (1 2) = −[ˆ1(˜2)] + (1− 1 (1 2)) ˆ1 (2) when 1  
since in both cases [1(1 ˜2)] = [ˆ1(˜2)1(1 ˜2)]. Given these transfers,
the budget deficit is then h
2 (1)− ˆ1 (2)
i
1 (1 2) when 1  h
ˆ1 (2)− ¯2 (1)
i
(1− 1 (1 2)) + −[ˆ1(˜2)] when 1  
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Focusing first on the region where   1  2, the subsidy there is the
whole gains from trade 2− 1. Since the eﬃcient expected gains from trade
in the M-S model with  [0 1]2 distribution is 1/6, the expected gains from
trade on the region   1  2 is (1− )3 6 (the probabilities and the gains
themselves are scaled by 1 − ).24 Now, in the region 2 +   1  , the
subsidy 1 − 2 − 2 can be interpreted as (a) paying the gains from trade
as if agent 1’s value were 1 −  and trade were eﬃcient for that value, and
then (b) getting back  on every trade that happened. In expectation, (a)
yields (− )3 6, and (b) yields  (− )2 2.25 Finally, we have the term
−[ˆ1(˜2)], which has to be paid when 1  , which in expectation costs
(1− ) £(− )2 2− (1− )2 2¤. Adding all the terms yields
(1− )3 6 + (− )3 6−  (− )2 2 + ¡(− )2 2− (1− )2 2¢ (1− )
= − + 1
2
2 − 2
3
3 − 1
2
2 + 2− 1
3
Requiring ex ante budget balance sets this expression to 0. We want to
express  through  but it’s easier to do the reverse. The solutions are:
 = 1−  (1− )± 1
3
q
3 (1− )3 (1− 3)
Putting both solutions on the same graph as red and black curves we get
24In general, the Myerson-Satterthwaite deficit with uniform distributions on [0 1] and
a “gap” equal to  is (1− 4)(1− )26 [see Myerson and Satterhwaite (1983, p. 277)]. So
when  = 0, the deficit is 1/6. We get (1 − )36 because the probability of being in the
region   1  2 is (1− )2 and the region is [0 1]2 scaled down by (1− ).
25Alternatively, the region max{1 2}   is a scaled-down version of a Myerson-
Satterthwaite [0 1]2 trading box with a “gap” equal to . Using the formula in footnote
XX, the Myerson-Satterthwaite deficit would be (1− 4 )(1− )6. The probability of an
outcome in this region is 2 and the deficit is scaled down by , so this region contributes
(− 4)(− )6 to the expected deficit.
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Combining the red and black curves yields  (), which we see is inverse U-
shaped.
The green line is the boundary of when IR1 (1) is satisfied, which is when
[ˆ1 (2)] ≤ ; i.e., −  ≥ 1− , or  ≥ (1 + ) 2. Intersecting the line with
the black curve we solve
1−  (1− )− 1
3
q
3 (1− )3 (1− 3) = (1 + ) 2
The solution is:  = 1
4
, and the corresponding level of  is  = 1 −
 (1− )− 1
3
q
3 (1− )3 (1− 3) = 58 = 0625
Thus,since the solution to the relaxed problem satisfies IR1(1) when  ≥
58, it is the actual solution in those cases. The case where  ≤ 38 and only
IR1 (1) binds is symmetric.
Expected Welfare Loss Calculation Now, calculate the expected wel-
fare loss when  ≥ 58. It is
36− (− )3 6−  (− )2 2 = 1
6
2 (3− 2) 
(The first term is if there were no trade at all for values below , the second
term is expected gains from trade on the triangle below  assuming that  is
wasted each time, and the third term accounts for  not being wasted.)
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Substituting  from the red and black curves into this expression yields
the welfare loss
1
6
2
µ
32 − 5 + 3±
q
3 (1− )3 (1− 3)
¶

which can be plotted as follows:
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Loss
Reducing  from 1 corresponds to moving along the curve clockwise, start-
ing on the red curve and then shifting to the black curve. Note that the loss
is increasing  as we reduce  from 1 for most of the red curve. The green
line here is the M-S welfare loss (i.e., when  = 1 and  = 14) which is
5
192
. The loss exceeds the M-S loss for   ˆ ≈ 0321, which corresponds tob ≥  ≈ 0720.
The point where welfare loss is maximized is given by solving
0 =


µ
2
µ
32 − 5 + 3 +
q
3 (1− )3 (1− 3)
¶¶
 ∈ [14 12]
The solution is  ≈ 0323, which corresponds to  ≈ 0839.
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8.3.2 Only IR1(1) binds
By symmetry, the solution has only IR1(1) bind when  ≤ 38 and results,
for each such , in identical welfare losses to the case with + 12.
8.3.3 Both IR1(0) and IR1(1) bind
When  ∈ (38 58)both IR1(0) and IR1(1) must bind. Applying (24), the
budget deficit in this case is
1 − 2 − 2 when 2 +   1  
2 − 1 − 2¯ when   1  2 − ¯,
0 otherwise.
By (15), [ˆ1(˜2)] = . This implies that the probabilities of the two
regions  ≡ { : 2 +   1  } and  ≡ { :   1  2 − ¯} are
equal (these are the two regions in which the final allocation diﬀers from
what would happen if agent 1 simply exercised his option optimally). This
involves having ¯ =  + (1− 2).
Consider first the case of  = 12. In this case, regions and have equal
probability when  = ¯. The optimal allocation in this case can be interpreted
as separate Myerson-Satterthwaite mechanisms for the cases 1 2  12 (in
which agent 1 is the buyer) and 1 2  12 (in which agent 1 is the seller),
with no cross-subsidization. The unique gap that achieves budget balance
and maximizes expected surplus is half of the Myerson-Satterthwaite gap:
12 = 12 · 14 = 18 For other  ∈ (38 58), we apply Lemma BOTH
IRs BIND.
8.4 Lemma 19
Lemma 19 When random or divisible property rights are feasible, resulting
in payoﬀs that are linear in , the maximal second-best welfare is convex in
the status quo level of , ˆ.
Proof. Let h i be a second-best optimal mechanism for status quo ˆ
and h0  0i be a second-best optimal mechanism for property rights ˆ0. For
 ∈ [0 1], consider the mechanism h00  00i =  h i + (1− ) h0  0i.
(Given linearity of payoﬀs, it is equivalent to the randomized mechanism
that implements h i with probability  and h0  0i with probability 1−.)
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Mechanism h00  00i inherits IC and BB from mechanisms h i and h0  0i,
and satisfies IR for status quo ˆ00 = ˆ+ (1− ) ˆ0.
Lemma 19 implies, in particular, that the set of status quos for which
first-best is achieved is convex (the set is nonempty by Segal-Whinston 2011),
and that a move in the direction of this set raises the second-best expected
surplus.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 16
Consider the Myerson-Satterthwaite solution, which corresponds to the case
of  = 1 and  = 0 of the above Lemma. Let 1 denote the Lagrange
multiplier on expected budget balance in this solution, and let b1 ≡ 1(1 +
1).
Now, fix the option price  and a type ˆ2 and consider the program
( ˆ2) of choosing the allocation rule, the utility mappings 1(·) and 2(·),
and the “ironing point ” [which aﬀects the solution through constraint (16)]
to maximize expected surplus plus 1 times expected revenue subject to
only IR2(ˆ2), IR1 (0), ICFOC, and constraint (16), with optimization being
over the allocation rule 1(·) and  ∈
h
ˆ2 1
i
. We will first show that there
is a type ˆ2 ∈ (2 (1)  1) such that the solution has  = 1 and the same
allocation rule as in the Myerson-Satterthwaite solution. Thus, this program
achieves the Myerson-Satterthwaite expected surplus,and, if  = 1, satisfies
xpected budget balance. Moreover, it also satisfies IR2(2) for all 2 as well
as monotonicity (and thus, global IC). Thus, the value of program (1 ˆ2)
is exactly the second-best (Myerson-Satterthwaite) expected surplus.
To see this, observe that by arguments in the proof of Lemma 14), the
solution takes the form described by (13) and (20) [note that we are in the
case 2 () ≤ 2 (1)  ˆ2]. Now maximization of the Lagrangian over  takes
the form
 ∈ arg max
0∈[ˆ21]
(1− 1 (0))
h
ˆ(˜2)(˜2 − ˆ2)
i
 (26)
By (19) and the fact that (|ˆ) ≤  ≤ 1 for each  = 1 2,  ∈ [0 1], we
must have
ˆ (2) = max{¯2(2|ˆ1)− 1(|ˆ1 0)} ≥ max{¯2(2|ˆ1)− 1 0} for 2  ˆ2
ˆ (2) = max{1(|ˆ1)− 2(2|ˆ1 0)} ≤ 1− 2(2|ˆ1) for 2  ˆ2
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and therefore
[ˆ(˜2)(˜2 − ˆ2)]
≤
Z 2(1|ˆ10)
2(|ˆ10)
[1− ¯2(2|ˆ)]2 (2) +
Z ˆ2
21|ˆ10)
[1− ¯2(2|ˆ)]2 (2)
+
Z 1
ˆ2
[1− 2(2|ˆ)]2 (2)
=
Z 2(1|ˆ10)
2(|ˆ10)
[1− ¯2(2|ˆ)]2 (2) +
Z 1
2(1|ˆ10)
[1− ¯2(2|ˆ)]2 (2)
+
Z 1
ˆ2
[¯2(2|ˆ)− 2(2|ˆ)]2 (2) 
The second integral is strictly negative [since ¯2(2|ˆ)  ¯2(2 (1) |ˆ) = 1
for all 2  2 (1)], while the first and third approach zero as ˆ2 → 1 [the
third integral equals ˆ
³
1− ˆ2
´
, while 2(|ˆ1 0)) → 2(1|ˆ1 0)) as ˆ2, and
hence , approaches 1]. Hence, their sum is negative for ˆ2 ∈ (2 (1)  1)
close enough to 1. Then (26) implies that the program for such values of ˆ2
is solved by setting  = 1.
Now fix ˆ∗2 ∈ (2 (1)  1) observe the following:
• The second-best expected surplus for  = 1 equals the value of program
(1 ˆ∗2)
• The value of program (1 ˆ∗2) exceeds the value of program (0 ˆ∗2)
for any 0 ∈ (ˆ∗2 1). This follows because a change from  = 1 to
0 ∈ (ˆ∗2 1) tightens the constraint IR2(ˆ2) in the relaxed program by
[1− 1 ()](− ˆ2) and does not aﬀect any other constraints.
• The value of program (0 ˆ∗2) for any 0 ∈ (ˆ∗2 1) exceeds the value
achieved if instead the ironing point  is set equal to 0 (by the argu-
ment above), which in turn exceeds the value that is achieved when we
maximize expected surplus plus ˆ1 times expected revenue subject to
all of the IR and IC constraints.
• Since theMyerson-Satterthwaite surplus exceeds the value that is achieved
when we maximize expected surplus plus ˆ1 times expected revenue
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subject to all of the IR and IC constraints, it must exceed the second-
best surplus that is achievable with option price 0 (otherwise the
second-best solution would have at least as large a value of expected
surplus plus ˆ1 times expected revenue as the Myerson-Satterthwaite
expected surplus).
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